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Gravity modelAfter describing the spatial distribution of the aeronautic industry in France, this study analyzes the determinants
of French regional bilateral exports and imports, according to a trade gravity model, for the period 2003–2010.
The appreciation of the euro has a negative impact on exports and a positive effect on imports, confirming the
fears of European politicians and managers in the aeronautic sector. The gravity equation, extended to integrate
factor complementarities among partners, also shows that labor productivity levels in France and its partner
countries are significant determinants of trade, supporting O-ring theory applied from Kremer (1993) to expli-
cate trade in the aeronautical sector. The spatial organization of this sector is also analyzed via the impact of for-
eign military spending on French trade. Finally, by distinguishing French imports and arrivals of products
manufactured in Europe and in France, supplementary estimations reveal that outward foreign direct investment
FDI affects the imports and arrivals of European products negatively but has positive influences on the imports
and arrivals of French products.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1 In addition to traditional competitors, such as Brazil's Embraer and its E-Jets (E190 and1. Introduction
Historically, France has been a major player in the aerospace indus-
try. At the end of World War I, France led aircraft production; only in
1930 did the United States start to acquire a dominant position, which
it strengthened after World War II. In the 1960s, France allied with the
United Kingdom to complete the Concorde project; in 1970, it coordi-
nated with Germany on the Aerospatiale, to be joined by CASA Spanish
in 1971 and British Aerospace in 1979. As a result of this process of
mergers and acquisitions, the European Aeronautic Defense and Space
(EADS) company was founded in 2000, to become the Airbus group
on January 1, 2014. As Table 1 shows, France ranks second in the
world as an exporter of aircraft and spacecraft, and Airbus is the second
most important firm in the defense and aerospace sector.
The aerospace industry (aeronautics and space) has a critical impor-
tance in France. Indeed, this sector accounts for nearly 4% of total indus-
trial employment and fosters various indirect jobs in related sectors. It is
also one of the few industrial sectors to have at least maintained em-
ployment levels throughout the 2000s. Moreover, since the end of the
1990s, France has suffered a deterioration of its trade balance; the
trade deficit of 231 million euros in 2003 increased to 24 billion euros
in 2005 and 70 billion euros by 2011. Few sectors have resisted this
troubling trend, such as luxury, pharmaceuticals, and aerospace. As
Fig. 1 shows, despite a wealth of economic crises over the past four
decades, the trade balance in the aerospace industry has remained
positive, with a growing surplus..A.T.T., University of Pau et Pay
Pau Cedex, France.
), serge.rey@univ-pau.fr (S. Rey)
E195), likely market entrants include Japan's Mitsubishi (MRJ-90), with a maiden flight
scheduled for 2014; the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, whose C919 plane,
seating 168–190, is scheduled for 2016; and theRussian company Irkut,with itsMS-21 de-
signed for 150 passengers. We also include on this list the Canadian firm Bombardier,s.Furthermore, amounting to 2546 million euros in 2009, R&D expendi-
tures by French aerospace firms represent 10% of the internal R&D
expenditures of French enterprises—the third most substantial, after
automobile and pharmaceutical sectors. For aerospace companies
during the 2000s, these expenses accounted for around 18% of their
total turnover. Furthermore, self-financed R&D represents 54% of global
R&D (the remaining 46% comes mainly from public funding; ECORYS,
2009).
Lastly, France seeks to integrate its regional aerospace sector in
regional policies (see Schönfeld and Jouaillec, 2008, p. 1). As of July
2005, 67 clusters, covering most industrial sectors, were approved by
the French government. The aeronautic and space industry was repre-
sented primarily in three clusters, located according to the industry's
historical regionalization: ASTech Paris in Ile-de-France, Aerospace
Valley spanning the Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrénées regions, and Pégase
in Provence-Alpes-Côte-d'Azur.
Considering that the aerospace sector thus constitutes one of the
main pillars of French industry, it is easy to understand why French au-
thorities became worried when the euro appreciated strongly against
the U.S. dollar. Competition also is increasing in the aeronautic industry.
Take the 100-plus seat jetliner category as an example. Products such as
Boeing's 737 or Airbus' A320 confront increasing horizontal and vertical
competition, all around the world,1 which is not limited to Airbus andwhich plans to deliver its CSseries, with 110 and 130 seats, in 2014.
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Fig. 1. Aeronautic and space trade in France.
Source: Chelem (calculations of authors).
Table 1
Firms and exporters in the aerospace sector.
Rank Aircraft and spacecraft exporters
(US$ billion and world share)
Top defense and aerospace companiesa
(revenue in the first half of 2013)
1 USA: $104.3 bn (30%) Boeing: $40.7 bnb
2 France: $54.5 bn (19.3%) EADS, Europe: $34.25 bn
3 Germany: $43.4 bn (15.4%) United Techno. Corp.: $30.40 bn
4 UK: $16.7 bn (5.9%) Lockheed Martin: $22.47 bn
5 Canada: $10.3 bn (3.6%) General Dynamics Corp.: $15.31 bn
6 Singapore: $6.0 bn (2.1%) Northrop Grumman: $12.39 bn
7 Italy: $5.7 bn (2.0%) BAE System, UK: $12.09 bn
8 Brazil: $5.2 bn (1.9%) Raytheon: $11.99 bn
9 Spain: $4.5 bn (1.6%) Finmeccanica, Italy: $10.43 bn
10 Japan: $3.9 bn (1.4%) GE Aviation: $10.37 bn
Source: ECORYS (2009) and http://www.army-technology.com/features/feature-highest-
earning-defence-and-aerospace-companies/, November 2013.
a Companies are based in the United States, unless otherwise indicated.
b The company expects to generate full-year revenues of $83–$86 bn in 2013.
346 F. Candau, S. Rey / Economic Modelling 41 (2014) 345–355Boeing but involves the entire aeronautic industry. European politicians
thus complain loudly about the barriers to export and international
competition, such as when former French President Nicolas Sarkozy
worried, in June 2008, “Every time that the euro appreciates by ten
cents, Airbus lose one billion euros! We cannot be competitive against
Boeing who sells in dollars, if the euro is 30% over-valued.2”
Airbus already has responded to this challenge, by relocating part of
its production and R&D. In 2008 the company began to assemble its
A320 in Tianjin, China. Starting in summer 2013, Airbus initiated
the construction of assembly lines for the A319, A320, and A321 in the
town of Mobile, Alabama (USA); aircraft assembly is slated to start in
2015.With this study, we aim to determinewhether these observations
are merely anecdotal or if the euro effectively has influenced the French
aeronautical industry.
We propose to analyze the evolution of the aircraft industry in
France, using a trade-based approach at the French regional level.
Thus, we attempt to determine precisely how producers have been af-
fected by worldwide competition and the appreciation of the euro.
Moreover, this article deals with the coordination and organization of
trade in the aeronautic sector in accordance with O-ring theory. In the
aerospace sector, where a simple O-ring was the cause of the tragic
crash of the space shuttle Challenger, Kremer (1993) asserts that the
value of a product depends on the value of its cheapest components.
By extending a standard gravity equation, we show that labor produc-
tivities in France and its partner countries are significant determinants
of trade, in support of the view that complementarities matter. In
addition, using military spending as a measure of local and specific
knowledge in each country, we interpret their positive impacts on ex-
port as an indication that trade may be driven by the unbundling of
the production process (Baldwin, 2006), with complementarities across
locations. Because French exports increase with military spending,
network effects appear to overtake any home bias (i.e., discriminatory
public procurement), which in turn implies that production processes
take place in interconnected locations. The introduction of FDI in the
aeronautic sector in partners' countries confirms this intuition. Finally,
we introduce a contractual friction variable that indicates that good in-
stitutions are a key determinant of trade in Europe but notwith partners
in the rest of the world. This result affirms a description offered by
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) about the fragmentation of the
Boeing 787, for which the division of the supply chain mainly involved
northern countries with minor technology differences but strong local
advantages (driven by economies of scale).
In the next section, we outline several stylized facts about the
aeronautic and space trade industries, including their main regions
and clusters. To our knowledge, Section 2 is the first description in the
literature of trade at the regional level in the aeronautic sector in2 http://www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank/print/5637.htm.France. After describing aeronautic trade by French region, we show
how it fits into awider European network. This section describes in par-
ticular how exports in destination to the U.S. have decreased while in
contrast exports to Germany have increased. These two elements po-
tentially indicate the effect of the Euro appreciation and reorientation
of the aeronautical sector inside the European Union. Lastly to illustrate
this European network, this section presents the A380 production
which is a symbolic element of the European factory. This huge project,
at a time of a strong euro, may have strengthened the internal hub and
spoke in Europe. The price competitiveness of the aeronautic sector is
our focus in Section 3. A gravity equation is presented in Section 4,
and we dedicate the next sections to estimate our proposed regional
export (Section 5) and regional import (Section 6) equations. We
conclude in Section 7.2. Trade and general description of France's aeronautic sector
Wedescribe briefly the evolution of exports and imports in the aero-
nautic sector during the 2000s, distinguishing total trade throughout
France from trade by French region.
The first cluster leads the fields of executive aviation, space travel,
and engines/equipment by bringing together more then 100,000 peo-
ple, who perform the majority of sector-specific R&D in France. Groups
and organizations involved in this cluster include Dassault Aviation,
Safran, Astrium, the CNES, and the European Space Agency, though
the Safran group performs perhaps the most notable industrial
activities. Aerospace Valley, a bi-regional aerospace cluster, leads the
European aerospace, space travel, and embedded system sector, with
a turnover of 10 billion euros. It comprises more than 200 companies,
including international groups such as EADS, Freescale Semiconductors,
Goodrich, Honeywell, and Siemens. In addition to a strong focus on
Airbus-related activities, Aquitaine is home to industrial activities by
Dassault Aviation and solid propulsion tests for the aerospace industry
(mainly by EADS Space Transportation, Snecma Propulsion Solide, and
SNPE). Finally, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur hosts Eurocopter and Thales
Alenia Space. These three clusters account for 78% of employment in the
aerospace sector (Fig. 2).2.1. Trade
French trade in the aeronautic industry has been characterized by
fast import growth from the UE15 during 2003–2006, and then relative
stagnation. In contrast, imports from the rest of the world (RoW)
increased strongly over the same period (Fig. 3), indicating a possible
impact of euro appreciation.
Fig. 2. Aerospace employment by French region (percentage).
Source: GIFAS.
347F. Candau, S. Rey / Economic Modelling 41 (2014) 345–355Despite this appreciation though, French exports to the RoWalso in-
creased during the 2000s (Fig. 4; cf. 2009, when the global recession
hit).
In analyzing the shares of different destinations (Fig. 5), it becomes
quickly clear that since the middle of the 1980s, the share of exports
to the United States declined, with a negative trend from 41% to 14%
of total exports, whereas in the same period, the share of exports to
Germany increased, to reach 33% of the total in 2010. In addition,
since the beginning of the 1990s, the share of exports to China increased
to 10%. These shifts confirm two overriding points: First, aeronautic sec-
tor firms have adjusted their strategies, to develop a European network
and encourage strengthened relations between Germany and France.
Second, exchanges with China have greatly increased. The decrease in
U.S. exports may be a result of these changes, but it also probably
stemmed from the overvaluation of the euro.
2.2. Industry clusters and regional trade
France comprises multiple administrative regions, each of which is
subdivided into departments. Some industrial clusters overlap several
regions, such as Aerospace Valley, which spans Aquitaine and Midi-
Pyrénées; in all cases, they cover several departments. To analyze the
exports of the three French aeronautic clusters, we present the evolu-
tion of exchanges by department.0
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Fig. 3. French imports.
Source: DNSCE-Pôle statistique.2.2.1. ASTech Paris
Ile de France (IDF) represents a central location, in that many goods
are produced there, before being exported to Midi-Pyrénées for final
production and assembly. As the main producer of aircraft and helicop-
ters, as well as a key producer of spacecraft, launchers, and navigation
equipment, IDF's aircraft industry employs 33,410 workers (as of
2010) (Buat, 2012). Although Seine-et-Marne clusters just a few firms,
it is the regional export platform (Fig. 6).
2.2.2. Aerospace Valley
Fig. 7 indicates exports by twomain departments in the two regions
in which this cluster locates. Toulouse, in Haute-Garonne, is the main
export city; its exports doubled between 2003 and 2011, from 13.7 to
31 billion euros. With its 2.4 billion euros in 2011, the neighboring re-
gion of Aquitaine is the third largest exporting region among aeronautic
firms, which cluster around Bordeaux in Gironde and, to a lesser extent,
in Pyrénées-Atlantiques. As Fig. 7 denotes though, themodern econom-
ic crisis halted the growth of aeronautic exports from Gironde.
2.2.3. Pégase
In the Provence-Alpes-Côte-d'Azur region, the Alpes-Maritimes and
Bouches-du-Rhône are themost important departments with regard to
aeronautic sector activity. Exports from Bouches-du-Rhône (Fig. 8)10 000
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Fig. 4. French exports.
Source: DNSCE-Pôle statistique.
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348 F. Candau, S. Rey / Economic Modelling 41 (2014) 345–355increased from 600 million euros in 2003 to 1056 million euros in
2011; those from the Alpes-Maritimes department remained relatively
stable during this period, at approximately 300 million euros. Exports
from other departments were limited, exhibiting values between 1
and 3 million euros.
To truly understand the trade flows in the aeronautic industry, we
must reconsider the organization of this sector, which has developed
as a network throughout Europe.0
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Fig. 7. Exports by the Aerospace Valley cluster.2.3. European regional networks: a case study
To investigate the core–periphery network that marks Toulouse at
the French and European regional levels, we use the launch of Airbus'
A380 aircraft as an interesting example. Map 1 details the logistic ele-
ments for the A380's construction, which demanded the involvement
of several European countries. Specifically, special boats transport
fuselages from Hamsbourg to Mostyn (UK), where they take on wings
manufactured in Broughton. Next, they go to Saint-Nazaire (Pays de la
Loire), where the boats onload the cockpit and aircraft nose sections,
received from Méaulte (Picardie) by Beluga. Finally, the travels end in
Aquitaine, passing below Bordeaux bridges (though only at low tide).
From Bordeaux (i.e., Langon) to Toulouse (Blagnac), parts of the plane0
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Fig. 6. Exports by the ASTech Paris cluster.
Source: DNSCE-Pôle statistique (million euros).get transported by special trucks over 237 km of road; the same road
is the route for the tail plane parts that come from Cadix (Puerto Real).
The significant investment required to build the A380 reflects the
efforts by the European aeronautic sector to retain its global ranking.
This network is representative of the general strategy adopted by theSource: DNSCE-Pôle statistique (million euros).
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Bo
uc
he
s-
du
-R
ho
ne
 a
nd
 A
lp
es
-M
ar
itim
es
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Bouches-du-Rhône Alpes-Maritimes
Hautes-Alpes Var
Vaucluse Alpes de Haute-Provence
Fig. 8. Exports by the Pégase cluster.
Source: DNSCE-Pôle statistique (million euros).
Map 1. Transport network for the A380.
Source: Zuliani and Jalabert (2005, p. 129).
349F. Candau, S. Rey / Economic Modelling 41 (2014) 345–355European aeronautic industry and results from the influences of both
political and economic factors. The choice also has several economic
consequences. First, this strategy ensures that production is not concen-
trated in one area but instead favors the development of different
European regions, with positive effects that may spread throughout
the economy (e.g., outsourcing). Second, the existence of these net-
works helps contribute to the development of intra-European trade.3. Price competitiveness
As noted in the Introduction section, the world aeronautic market
mainly features competition between Europe and the United States.
Therefore the euro–dollar exchange rate is important, and price or
cost competitiveness is a fundamental variable determining aeronautic
equipment sales worldwide.
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5 Groupement des Industries Françaises Aéronautiques et Spatiales.
6 See http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/farnborough-air-show/2010-07-21/
french-aerospace-awaits-2011-recovery. Many officials of the French and European aero-
nautic industries appear to consider the equilibrium exchange rate for this industry to be
around $1.20 per euro. This type of statement is not supported by a possiblemodel of equi-
librium exchange rates of a particular industry.
350 F. Candau, S. Rey / Economic Modelling 41 (2014) 345–3553.1. Why is the euro–dollar exchange rate important?
Because of the central duopoly of the aircraft market (Airbus versus
Boeing), the euro–dollar exchange rate is an essential feature in deter-
mining firms' strategies. The invoice currency for the international
trade of aircraft and spacecraft is the U.S. dollar, so for constantmargins,
a depreciation of the dollar (cf. appreciation of the euro) implies a re-
duction (cf. rise) in Airbus's revenues expressed in euros. In addition,
a dollar depreciation or euro appreciation increases the export prices
for Airbus in dollars, except if the export price, as expressed in the
exporter's currency, is reduced.
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2011) propose a duopoly model of the market
for Airbus's A320 and Boeing's 737 aircraft families. The model simu-
lates the impact of an appreciation by the euro. Estimating that price
elasticities for aircraft exports to demand are equivalent to a ratio of
2-to-6, depending on the destination markets, they conclude that a
euro appreciation of 10% that passes completely through to the prices
of imported goods (no reduction of margins) reduces “Airbus sales by
20–60% in volume and 10–50% in euro-denominated value” (Bénassy-
Quéré et al., 2011, p. 627). However, if Frenchproducers absorb some ex-
change rate variations, incomplete pass-through occurs. Generally, ad-
justments in the margins of producers, to avoid passing on all exchange
rate variations to the prices of imported aircraft, dependon the price elas-
ticity of aircraft demand. In turn, Airbus faces a dilemma, because its sales
are denominated in dollars, but its production sites are in France,
Germany, and Spain, in the euro zone. In contrast, Boeing is protected
from exchange rate changes because it produces and sells in dollars.
3.2. Measure of price competitiveness
To characterize price competitiveness, we consider the behavior of
relative prices and real exchange rates for key segments of the aero-
space market. For the aerospace sector, the relative price, or bilateral
real exchange rate, between France and the United States (RFra/USA) is
RFra=USA ¼
N  P
P
; ð1Þ
where N represents the nominal exchange rate of the euro against the
U.S. dollar, P is the industry producer price of France, and P⁎ is the
price for the U.S. aerospace industry.3 An increase in R reflects a real ap-
preciation of the euro and thus a loss in competitiveness for the French
industry. Because data on U.S. deflators are available for aircraft
manufacturing, engine manufacturing, aircraft equipment, and mis-
siles,4 we can calculate different real exchange rates for each index.3 For France, this price index is not available. Calculations with the production price in-
dex for French industry, beyond specific markets, to include all areas and transport equip-
ment, lead to similar results.
4 Source: Aerospace Industries Association, Bureau of Labor Statistics andBureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis.Thus, for i = aircraft manufacturing, engine manufacturing, aircraft
equipment, or missiles, Pi⁎ is the price of a product by i, and the real
exchange rate can be rewritten as RFra/USA,i = N · P / Pi⁎.
At first glance, swings in the real exchange rate and depreciation/
appreciation phases appear linked to fluctuations of the nominal
exchange rate for the euro/dollar (Fig. 9). The strong real appreciation
between 2001 and 2008 coincides with the appreciation of the euro
and likely explains the fears of the European aerospace industry. Ac-
cording to GIFAS5 chairperson J.-P. Herteman, every 10 cents that the
euro rises above this “balanced” rate means an average 2% loss in oper-
ating profit on revenue, such that “Over the last three years this makes
more than 4 billion in lost earnings, or the equivalent of two years' self-
financed research and development or 7000 jobs a year not created in
France” (Apter, 2010).6 In truth though, behaviors vary with the differ-
ent products. During the period, we observe changes in competitive-
ness, namely, in the relative prices of products between France and
the United States. A stronger real appreciation/rise of relative prices is
observable for the missiles, but the increases in the relative prices of
engines and aircrafts appear more limited. That is, France improved its
competitiveness in the production of engines and, to a certain extent,
aircraft, but it lost competitiveness in the production of missiles.
Increased international competition in some product markets could
have led U.S. producers to adapt their margins and their costs.
(See Fig. 10.)
4. Theoretical and empirical strategies
To our knowledge, the gravity equation, which is the most common
tool to analyze trade at the product and industry level (see Helpman
et al., 2008), has not yet been used to analyze France's aeronautic
trade. Consider the standard gravity equation obtained by Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003):
Xij ¼
yiy j
Π jΠi
τij
1−σ
; ð1Þ
where bilateral exports Xij depend on expenditures/production in the
aeronautical sector in each country (yiyj), on price indices (ΠjΠi), and
on an inverse measure of bilateral trade costs (τij1 − σ with sigma as
the elasticity of substitution between varieties).
A wide range of theoretical models, from oligopolistic to monopolis-
tic, as well as those based on national product differentiation and com-
parative advantages, with and without non-homothetic preferences,
provide similar equations (see Candau and Dienesch, 2011; Head and
Mayer, 2011). The appeal of Anderson and van Wincoop's (2003)
model is that the production function is not specified and thus can be
extended to include various factors.7 Inspired by Kremer (1993, eq. 31)
we assume that the production process requires tasks that are comple-
mentary and located in different countries, such as8:
yi ¼ qikið Þφi q jk j
 ψi ð2Þ
where qi is a worker's skill at a particular task; ki is the amount of capital;
andφi and ψi represent domestic technology, including requirements for
input produced locally and abroad, respectively. In the extreme case at7 Anderson (2011) speaks about “modularity” and Anderson et al. (2014) exploit this
property to introduce external economies of scale.
8 Notice that the Armington's assumption of Anderson and vanWincoop's (2003) con-
sideration that goods are differentiated by country of origin is here verified by the elastic-
ity of substitution between factors that are specific to the country where the good is
produced.
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Fig. 10. Import and arrival schematic.
351F. Candau, S. Rey / Economic Modelling 41 (2014) 345–355which ψi = 0, domestic production only depends on domestic input
(if φi = 0, the country i is only a platform where assembly occurs),
but at positive values of this parameter, the amount of capital and ex-
pertise of workers in partners' countries become crucial too. If a worker
performs badly or physical capital malfunctions, the supply chainmight
be broken.
We estimate a reduced form of this model by directly inserting this
expression (and its counterpart for country j)9 in Eq. (1):
Xij ¼
kiqið Þψ jþφi k jq j
 ψiþφ j
Π jΠi
τij
1−σ
: ð3Þ
Although a standard gravity equationwould predict that economical
masses (e.g., GDP of country i and GDP of country j) influence trade
flows in the same way (with an elasticity of income equal to 1, as in
Eq. (4)), here we have no reason to expect that ψi + φj = ψj + φi = 1.
Instead, the production process likely involves asymmetrical relation-
ships. For example, the following ranking
ψ j þ φiN1Nψi þ φ jN0 ð4Þ
indicates that exports from i to j benefit from economies of scale at i
(which is possible even if there are decreasing returns at the factor
level, as in Kremer (1993, p. 571), when ψj b 1 and φi b 1) and from
diseconomies from outsourcing/producing in j.10
The next step is to understand firms' incentives to outsource their
production to the partner country. In contrast with models in which
lower costs of production abroad are the determinants, the supply
chain in the aeronautic sector may be weakened by relocation to coun-
tries where capital and skills are low, but the overvaluation of the
exchange rate also can be a determinant of relocation. If the euro is
overvalued, firms might find it profitable to relocate their activities
outside the euro area in countries with similar levels of technology.
This situation can occur if the exchange rate constitutes a cost in the
bilateral relationship. We follow prior literature (e.g., Anderson et al.,
2014) and consider the function of bilateral trade costs as follows:
τij ¼ eijdij exp bEUð Þ; ð5Þ
where eij represents the exchange rate, dij is the distance between part-
ners, and bEU is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for intra-European flows
and 0 otherwise. With this dummy variable, we can determine if there
is a European border effect in the aeronautic industry.9 It may be interesting to obtain the demand of capital and labor at equilibrium and in-
sert these expressions into the gravity equation. We leave this effort for future research;
Mirza and Nicoletti (2004) offer a first step.
10 We do not restrict these parameters; a total opposite rankingmay be observed, but in-
equality (Eq. (4)) seems most natural.Regarding the exchange rate, we successively consider the nominal
dollar–euro rate and the fourmeasures of real exchange rates described
in the previous section. Inserting Eq. (5) in Eq. (3) and taking the
logarithm gives:
lnXij ¼ ψ j þ φi
 
lnqi þ ψi þ φ j
 
lnqj þ ln kiψ jþφi k jψiþφ j
 
þ 1−σð Þ lneij þ 1−σð Þ lndij þ bEU : ð6Þ
As a proxy forworkers' productivity qi and qj, we use GDP per capita.
To measure ki
ψ jþφi k j
ψiþφ j , we use different variables, including both
standard options, such as FDI in the aeronautic sector and R&D, as well
as more specific measures, such as military spending. Denoted by mj,
military spending often focuses on high-tech products. For developing
countries in particular, increased military spending likely winds up in
the hands of foreign exporters rather than locals. Furthermore, even in
north–north relationships, military spending can promote specific
knowledge in each nation, which can be useful for developing comple-
mentary inputs, as suggested by O-ring theory. Similarly, in describing
the supply chain of the Boeing 747, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012) highlight the importance of trade between northern countries,
due to the specialized knowledge developed in this sector; they even
note the influence ofmilitary spending: “countries that perform the var-
ious tasks display no clear pattern of technological advantage. Rather,
experience and local knowledge play a central role. Apparently, exper-
tise most often derives from similar tasks being performed for other
Boeing projects or for related industries, such as military aviation.”
We include an indicator of air transport (carriers' departures world-
wide) to proxy for partner demand for aircraft products. Finally, the
price of oil might affect trade in the aeronautic sector; a price increase
likely exerts a negative short-run effect by prompting consumers to
defer their purchases but a positive long-run effect through the pur-
chase ofmore efficient aircraft technologies ultimately. Thus, the bench-
mark equation estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) is: Xijt =
β1 ln yit + β2 ln yjt + β3 ln et + β4 ln mjt + β5 ln ot + β6 ln dij + β7 ln
ajt + bEU + εijt.
We summarize the study variables in Table 2.
5. Export equations
We present the estimates of the export equations in Table 3. A first
striking result pertains to the strong coefficient of French regional GDP
per capita,which ismuch stronger than the coefficient of GDPper capita
in the partner country, in support of our assumption about economies of
scale in the country of origin (inequality (4)). The positive significant
impact of partner GDP per capita suggests evidence of a north–north
relationship in the production process, as indicated by O-ring theory.
The negative impact of exchange rate also is noteworthy and stron-
ger than any other determinant. We observe that a gain of 1% in French
Table 2
Data sources.
Variable Name Source
yit French regional income per capita INSEE
yjt National GDP per capita GDP: IFS
Population: WDI database
eijt Nominal exchange rate €/$ IFS
ot Oil price IFS
mjt Military spending SIPRI
dij Distance CEPII
ajt Air transport WDI database
rjt R&D STAN
Notes: All variables are expressed in thousands of dollars.
INSEE for InstitutNational de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques; IFS for Internation-
al Financial Statistics; WDI for World Development Indicators; SIPRI for Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute; CEPII for Centre d'Études Prospectives et
d'Informations Internationales and STAN for Structural Analysis, OECD databases.
Table 4
Export equation: individual fixed effects.
Nominal exchange rate Real exchange rate
yi 5.99⁎⁎⁎ 5.78⁎⁎⁎
0.74 0.73
yj 0.17 0.19
0.18 0.18
et −7.93⁎⁎ −3.5⁎⁎
3.99 3.6
mj 1.39⁎⁎ 1.27⁎⁎
0.58 0.58
aj −0.03 0.10
0.56 0.56
ot −0.52 −1.3⁎
0.8 0.18
dij −0.05⁎⁎ −0.05⁎
0.02 0.02
rjt −0.18⁎⁎ −0.17⁎⁎
0.09 0.09
Intercept 8.81 −25.7⁎
24 14
R2 0.31 0. 31
Obs 482 482
Notes: Robust standard errors appear under the coefficients.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.
⁎ Significant at 10%.
352 F. Candau, S. Rey / Economic Modelling 41 (2014) 345–355productivity can be offset by a 1% increase in the nominal exchange rate,
because trade elasticities are similar (i.e., 5.2 and−5.35).
Moreover, this result appears robust. Only the coefficient of the
relative price of engines is not significant; notably, for these products,
appreciation is lower too (Fig. 9). This result may indicate that engine
manufacturers have undertaken more price-related efforts than other
firms in the industry.
Air transport, as measured by registered carrier departures, fosters
exports of French firms, likely due to the strong market entry of these
firms into hub airports, for which maintenance is a serious concern.
Similarly, military expenditures by partners benefit the French
aeronautic industry. This result clearly supports Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg's (2012) prediction of the importance of specific knowledge.
The result also is noteworthy, in that it opposes a counterargument.
For security reasons, nations prefer domestic producers, such that a
rise in public demand in j might not affect production in i. Brülhart
and Trionfetti (2009) show that nationally discriminatory public pro-
curement in Europe reduces trade. The positive impact we find instead
indicates that the home bias problem can be overtaken by internationalTable 3
Export equation: ordinary least squares.
Nominal
exchange
rate
Real exchange rate
Aeronautic Aircraft Engine Equipment
yi 5.2⁎⁎⁎ 5.06⁎⁎⁎ 5.07⁎⁎⁎ 5.01⁎⁎⁎ 5.06⁎⁎⁎
0.2 0.19 0.2 0.19 0.19
yj 0.24⁎⁎⁎ 0.23⁎⁎⁎ 0.23⁎⁎⁎ 0.23⁎⁎⁎ 0.24⁎⁎⁎
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
ei −5.35⁎⁎⁎ −2.09⁎⁎ −2.19⁎⁎ −0.68 −2.91⁎⁎⁎
1.14 0.94 0.01 0.77 0.97
mj 0.18⁎⁎⁎ 0.18⁎⁎⁎ 0.18⁎⁎⁎ 0.18⁎⁎⁎ 0.19⁎⁎⁎
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
aj 0.65⁎⁎⁎ 0.65⁎⁎⁎ 0.65⁎⁎⁎ 0.65⁎⁎⁎ 0.64⁎⁎⁎
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
ot −0.64⁎⁎⁎ −1.23⁎⁎⁎ −1.36⁎⁎⁎ −1.54⁎⁎⁎ −0.70⁎⁎
0.23 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.33
dij −0.12⁎⁎⁎ −0.12⁎⁎⁎ −0.12⁎⁎⁎ −0.12⁎⁎⁎ −0.12⁎⁎⁎
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
bEU −1.00⁎⁎⁎ −0.99⁎⁎⁎ −0.99⁎⁎⁎ −0.99⁎⁎⁎ −1 .00⁎⁎⁎
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Intercept 16.81⁎⁎ −9.38⁎⁎⁎ −8.63⁎⁎ −14.46⁎⁎⁎ −8.27⁎⁎⁎
0.94 1.27 3.83 1.94 3.13
R2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Obs. 5819 5819 5819 5819 5819
Notes: Robust standard errors appear under the coefficients.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.fragmentation of the supply chain. Due to global network effects, an
increase in military spending in j fosters exports by i.
As expected, because it increases final usage costs, the price of oil is
detrimental for exports.
However, not controlling for unobserved or individual effects might
lead to bias in the resulting estimates.We reduced the partners' hetero-
geneity through sample selection. That is, we estimated our equations
with data obtained exclusively from exports to OECDpartners.Working
with these countries improves the analysis by introducing a key vari-
able: R&D expenditures in the aeronautic sector (obtained from the
STAN database). We provide the results in Table 4. In particular, we
note that the exchange rate andmilitary spending have stronger effects
on exports to OEDC partners, which confirms existing results. More sur-
prising with regard to O-ring theory is the negative impact of partners'
expenditures in R&D, which implies that the competition effect, not
taken into account by this theory, also has a role in the aeronautical
sector.
Let's now turn toward the econometric technique. The sample selec-
tion technique is not ideal for getting an overall picture of trade though.
The log-linearization also creates sample selection bias, by eliminating
zero flows, which is problematic because beyond inter- and intra-
trade (or one- and two-way trade), a third major category exists: no
trade.11 In this case, heteroskedasticity is a serious problem, because
the distribution of bilateral trade data likely corresponds to a Poisson
distribution. Using Monte Carlo simulations, Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006, 2009) show that the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
(PPML) offers an efficient estimator for dealing with heteroskedasticity.
We follow their methodology and treat zero trade flows using PPML.
We thus work with the whole sample of countries and include both
importer and exporter fixed effects, as we summarize in Table 5.
Many variables still have explanatory power, such as the exchange
rate, air transport, and the price of oil. Some part of the economies of
scale that are invariant in time can be captured by fixed effects, which
reveals that regions in which the main clusters are located experienced
stronger effects. The fixed effects for regional exporters are highly
significant, with the highest impact obtained for Midi-Pyrénées, IDF,
and Aquitaine. Military expenditures, invariant in time, are no longer11 Investigating 158 countries, Helpman et al. (2008)find that two-way trade represents
30%, one-way 10%, and no trade can represent up to 60%, depending on the year.
Table 5
Export equation: PPML method.
Nominal
exchange
rate
Real exchange rate
Aeronautic Aircraft Engine Equipment
yi 4.37⁎⁎⁎ 2.52⁎⁎⁎ 2.50⁎⁎⁎ 2.19⁎⁎⁎ 0.84⁎⁎⁎
1.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
yj 0.44⁎⁎⁎ 0.54⁎⁎⁎ 0.53⁎⁎⁎ 0.54⁎⁎⁎ 0.51
0.36 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.36
et −3.48⁎⁎⁎ −1.44⁎⁎⁎ −1.35⁎⁎⁎ −1.05⁎⁎⁎ 1.64⁎⁎⁎
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
mj −0.37 −0.5 −0.48 −0.52 −0.44
0.30 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31
aj 0.25⁎ 0.24⁎ 0.25⁎ 0.24⁎ 0.26⁎
0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14
ot −0.20⁎⁎⁎ −0.05⁎⁎⁎ −0.1⁎⁎⁎ −0.02⁎⁎⁎ −0.25⁎⁎⁎
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
dij −0.27 0.36 0.6 0.43 1.36
1513 1512 1513 1511 1604
Intercept 15.9 −0.03 −2.91 −1.23 −8.14
13,578 13,569 13,578 13,564 3107
Midi 5.69⁎⁎⁎ 5.5⁎⁎⁎ 5.5⁎⁎⁎ 5.46⁎⁎⁎ 5.32⁎⁎⁎
0.57 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55
IDF 2.71⁎⁎⁎ 3.54⁎⁎⁎ 3.55⁎⁎⁎ 3.69⁎⁎⁎ 4.29⁎⁎⁎
0.82 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63
Aquitaine 4.04⁎⁎⁎ 3.84⁎⁎⁎ 3.85⁎⁎⁎ 3.81⁎⁎⁎ 3.67⁎⁎⁎
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed effects
(departments +
partners)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 10,011 10,011 10,011 10,011 10,011
Pseudo R2 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
Notes: Robust standard errors appear under the coefficients.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
⁎ Significant at 10%.
353F. Candau, S. Rey / Economic Modelling 41 (2014) 345–355significant, which is logical because their effects can be captured by
partner fixed effects.
Despite these controls and the change in the estimator, inequality
(Eq. (4)) still can be verified, which reinforces the argument of strong
complementary between factors in France and abroad as an explanation
of trade in the aeronautic sector.Table 6
Import equation: ordinary least squares.
Nominal
exchange
rate
Real exchange rate
Aeronautic Aircraft Engine Equipment
yi 0.79 0.90 0.93⁎ 1.08⁎⁎ 1.45⁎⁎
0.77 0.55 0.56 0.51 0.53
yj 0.20⁎⁎⁎ 0.20⁎⁎⁎ 0.20⁎⁎⁎ 0.20⁎⁎⁎ 0.20⁎⁎⁎
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
et 1.31 1.50⁎⁎ 1.33⁎ 1.34⁎⁎ −0.01
1.19 0.70 0.71 0.52 0.72
mj 0.34⁎⁎⁎ 0.35⁎⁎⁎ 0.35⁎⁎⁎ 0.35⁎⁎⁎ 0.35⁎⁎⁎
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
aj 0.39⁎⁎⁎ 0.39⁎⁎⁎ 0.39⁎⁎⁎ 0.39⁎⁎⁎ 0.39⁎⁎⁎
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
ot −0.14 −0.17 −0.12 −0.17 −0.12
0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
dij −0.08⁎⁎⁎ −0.08⁎⁎⁎ −0.08⁎⁎⁎ −0.08⁎⁎⁎ −0.08⁎⁎⁎
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Intercept −32.99⁎⁎⁎ −32.37⁎⁎⁎ −32.44⁎⁎⁎ −32.77⁎⁎⁎ 35.30⁎⁎⁎
8.15 8.05 8.04 7.89 7.89
Fixed effects
(departments)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Obs. 8398 8398 8398 8398 8398
Notes: Robust standard errors appear under the coefficients.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.
⁎ Significant at 10%.6. Import equations
6.1. Traditional variables for interfirm trade
To analyze imports, we work at the county level (departments). We
first use OLS, then PPML. The GDP per capita again has a positive effect
(Table 6). Real appreciation of the euro leads to increased imports, espe-
cially in aircrafts and engines,whereas the relative price has no effect on
equipment imports. In addition, the estimates provide standard results
for the distance variable, with significant negative coefficients, and the
oil price effect is not significant.
When we account for the zero flows (Table 7), the coefficient of real
exchange rates differs from zero in only one case, for equipment
imports. The coefficient of oil price remains non-significant, and the
coefficients of distance and air transport preserve the same signs but
are higher in absolute value.
6.2. FDI, contracts, and exchange rate
The export data do not present any particularity, but the database of
regional imports is more accurate, because we have information about
not only imports but also arrivals. That is, customs services define as
an import all products that come from a country outside the European
Community (EC), whereas arrivals refer to products exchanged within
the EC. This database also provides the country of origin, which allows
us to distinguish several cases:
1. Imports of goods produced in the RoW, such as a product built in the
United States and directly imported into a French region.
2. Arrival of goods produced in the RoW, such as a product built in the
United States, imported into the Netherlands, and then exported to
Ile de France, which represents an arrival from the United States.
3. Import of goods produced in the EC, such as a product built in Spain,
outsourced in China, and then imported by a French region.
4. Arrival of goods produced in the EC, such as a product built in Spain
and directly imported by a French region.
5. Import of goods produced in France, such as a product built in Ile
de France, improved in the United States, and imported into Midi-
Pyrénées.
6. Arrival of goods produced in France, such as a product built in Ile de
France, improved in Germany, and imported into Midi-Pyrénées.
We cannot follow all travel by the product or the value added by
each partner, but whether flows enter France as arrivals or imports rep-
resents precious information regarding the international fragmentation
of the supply chain. Some flows, such as French arrivals or French im-
ports, include intra-firm trade and outsourcing in partners' countries,
first produced in France, improved abroad or in European countries,
and then re-imported into France.
In comparison with the previous analysis, we introduce FDI in
the aeronautic sector, denoted fdijt, a variable that fits quite well with
O-ring theory. Eq. (3) establishes the importance of capital in i and j as
a source of complementarities in the supply chain. We use OECD data,
which provide inward and outward flows, to control for impact of the
exit and entry of capital on French regions' imports.
In addition, we consider contracts between partners. Incomplete
contracts are at the heart of the difficulties associated with explaining
partner selection for outsourced production. Prior literature in interna-
tional economics is prolific on this topic; contractual frictions clearly af-
fect both location choices and trade (Acemoglu et al., 2007; Costinot,
2009; Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). Countries with good contractual
institutions also enjoy a comparative advantage in the trade of
contract-intensive goods. As a proxy for the contractual environment,
we follow Nunn (2007) and Defever and Toubal (2007) and use
the “rule of law” variable from the Governance Matters database
(Kaufmann et al., 2009). This variable, which we denote cjt, is based on
Table 7
Import equation: PPML.
Nominal
exchange
rate
Real exchange rate
Aeronautic Aircraft Engine Equipment
yi 1.01 1.42⁎⁎⁎ 1.46⁎⁎⁎ 1.33⁎⁎⁎ −0.47
0.77 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.71
yj 0.11⁎ 0.11⁎ 0.12⁎ 0.11⁎ 0.12⁎
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
et 0.58 −0.45 −0.54 −0.34 3.05⁎⁎⁎
1.11 0.57 0.57 0.43 0.90
mj −0.25⁎⁎⁎ −0.25⁎⁎⁎ −0.25⁎⁎⁎ −0.25⁎⁎⁎ −0.24⁎⁎⁎
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
aj 1.94⁎⁎⁎ 1.93⁎⁎⁎ 1.93⁎⁎⁎ 1.93⁎⁎⁎ 1.93⁎⁎⁎
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
ot 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.23 −0.18
0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20
dij −1.06⁎⁎⁎ −1.06⁎⁎⁎ −1.06⁎⁎⁎ −1.06⁎⁎⁎ −1.06⁎⁎⁎
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
Intercept −26.82⁎⁎⁎ −28.04⁎⁎⁎ −28.24⁎⁎⁎ −27.04⁎⁎⁎ −9.54
8.28 7.64 7.62 7.83 9.27
Fixed effects
(departments)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Obs 88,990 88,990 88,990 88,990 88,990
Notes: Robust standard errors appear under the coefficients.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
⁎ Significant at 10%.
Table 8
FDI and contract environment.
Variable Name Source
cjt Contract environment Governance matters database
fdijt Inward flows, outward flows OECD database
354 F. Candau, S. Rey / Economic Modelling 41 (2014) 345–355surveys of businesspeople and polls of experts, and it measures percep-
tions of the effectiveness and enforceability of contracts.
To analyze the relevance of FDI, the contract environment, and the
exchange rate on trade, we propose to fully exploit flows exiting
France and/or the EC and then entering French regions as imports or ar-
rivals. We use OLS without fixed effects, out of consideration of the size
of the sample, which decreases substantially at this desegregated levelTable 9
Imports and arrivals of European products.
Imports EC
Inward FDI Outward FDI
OLS (FE) Logit OLS (FE) Logit
yi 1.96 0.05⁎⁎⁎ 3.08 0.04⁎⁎⁎
1.49 0.00 1.95 0.00
yj 1.53 0.001⁎⁎⁎ −5.51 0.001
1.36 0.00 9.99 0.00
dij −1.99 −0.75⁎⁎⁎ −11.25 −0.79⁎⁎⁎
1.7 0.16 14.4 0.15
et −11.98 −3.72⁎⁎⁎ −8.41 −5.40⁎⁎⁎
9.7 1.02 20.43 1.05
cjt −2.17⁎⁎ −0.01 1.88 0.22
1.11 0.18 7.38 0.20
fdijt 0.20 −0.15 0.35 −0.45⁎⁎
0.25 0.12 0.41 0.19
Intercept 72.04 1.29 114
57.98 1.25 85
R2 0.14 0.12 0.21 0.11
Obs. 54 2091 37 2091
Wald stat. 66⁎⁎⁎ 72⁎⁎⁎
Notes: Robust standard errors appear under the coefficients. FE = fixed effects.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.of trade. In addition, to check the robustness of our analysis, we adopted
a logit model, in which we could use all the data available (see also
Helpman et al., 2008). We successively estimate the probability of
importing each kind of flows. More precisely, we use the following
equation:
Probkjt ¼ β1yi þ β2yj þ β3dij þ β4et þ β5cjt þ β6 fdijt þ εkjt; ð7Þ
where k= EC imports, EC arrivals, RoW imports, RoW arrivals, France
imports, or France arrivals.
Table 9 contains the OLS and logit results, using inward FDI and
outward FDI separately (to reduce the potential for collinearity bias).
In each case, the dependant variable takes a value of 1 for EC imports,
whereas all other flows take a value of 0. As these findings show, the
exchange rate has a negative impact on imports but a positive effect
on arrivals in European flows in three of the four specifications. Further-
more, inward FDI in the aeronautic sector indicates no impact on EC im-
ports, though the European outward flow negatively affects the
probability of imports from these countries. The results are the same
for arrivals. A good contractual environment does not affect imports
(cf. negatively with OLS and inward FDI) but reveals a positive impact
on arrivals. Thus, in the European community, contract efficiency re-
mains important, whereas RoW exchanges in the aeronautic sector do
not seem determined by contractual institutions. The entire output
could be destroyed by the malfunction of a simple component, which
may explain why even a good contract environment in the RoW is not
enough to ensure confidence in the longer production chain, which
may be more fragile and prone to failure (Levine, 2012).
In Table 10 we present the results for arrivals and imports of French
products—that is, products built in France, improved in a foreign
country, and then imported into a French region. We depart from the
standard gravity equation by not considering exporter GDP, which
would be redundant, or distance, which equals 0 for all flows.
The coefficients of exchange rate again are negative, indicating that
an appreciation of the euro increases the difficulty of exporting products
of French origin, as well as the difficulty of reimporting these products
after improvement. Outward FDI has a positive effect on the probability
of importing products of French origin. This result may illustrate firms'
reorganization trends: FDI from France to EC or the RoW increases
imports.Arrivals EC
Inward FDI Outward FDI
OLS (FE) Logit OLS (FE) Logit
5.63⁎⁎⁎ −0.01⁎⁎ 7.49⁎⁎⁎ −0.01⁎⁎
1.13 0.005 1.04 0.006
5.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.007⁎⁎⁎ −15.37⁎⁎ 0.004⁎⁎⁎
0.71 0.00 4.6 0.00
−0.48 −0.55 −17.26⁎⁎⁎ −0.74⁎⁎⁎
0.80 0.00 4.40 0.11
−15.6⁎⁎⁎ 2.72⁎⁎⁎ 11.02 1.43⁎⁎
4.92 0.64 7.82 0.68
2.25⁎⁎⁎ 0.36⁎⁎⁎ 14.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.57⁎⁎⁎
0.55 0.10 4.26 0.12
0.10 −0.24 −0.33 −0.42⁎⁎⁎
0.12 0.07 0.21 0.15
49.49 −3.59⁎⁎⁎ 48.4 −2.15
30.84 0.8 37.2 0.8
0.39 0.15 0.31 0.18
171 2091 122 2091
112⁎⁎⁎ 247⁎⁎⁎
Table 10
Imports and arrivals of French products.
Imports RoW Arrivals RoW
Inward FDI Outward FDI Inward FDI Outward FDI
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit
yi 10.51⁎⁎⁎ −0.01 10.13⁎⁎⁎ 0.01 10.07⁎⁎⁎ −0.01 9.91⁎⁎ 0.01
2.27 0.01 2.04 0.01 2.63 0.01 2.55 0.01
et −18.76⁎⁎ −1.57 −18.8⁎⁎ −1.66 −21.06⁎⁎ −2.61 −20.3⁎⁎ −3.11⁎
8.8 1.29 7.71 1.37 10.4 1.7 9.9 1.83
cjt −12.19 0.6⁎⁎⁎ −3.8 0.23 7.8 0.59⁎⁎⁎ −1.45 0.21
13.8 0.2 15.47 0.24 16.5 0.21 19 0.25
fdijt 0.06 0.05 0.38 0.46⁎⁎⁎ −0.05 0.11 −0.39 0.50⁎⁎⁎
0.76 0.09 0.75 0.07 −0.06 0.09 0.92 0.07
Intercept 124 −1.37 114 −0.83 112⁎⁎ 15.24 121⁎⁎ 19.16
53 1.53 40 1.61 62 12.03 52 12.8
R2 0.27 0.02 0.28 0.04 0.21 0.02 0.19 0.05
Obs used 65 2091 75 2091 62 2091 72 2091
Wald stat. 14.7⁎⁎⁎ 40⁎⁎⁎ 16⁎⁎⁎ 49⁎⁎⁎
Notes: Robust standard errors appear under the coefficients.
⁎⁎⁎ Significant at 1%.
⁎⁎ Significant at 5%.
⁎ Significant at 10%.
355F. Candau, S. Rey / Economic Modelling 41 (2014) 345–3557. Conclusion
In this article, we have sought to explain France's aeronautic trade
over the period 2003–2010. To do so, we studied exports and imports
out of and into different French regions. The choice to study regional
trade appears justified by France's own political and economic decisions
to establish three aerospace/aeronautic industry clusters. In addition,
geographical locations of firms of this sector reflect political events,
including the two world wars, as well as a heritage dating back to the
beginning of aviation. Estimates of gravitymodels, usingpanelmethods,
thus can reveal the influence of different trade determinants. First, GDP
per capita has the positive expected effects on exports and imports. Sec-
ond, the appreciation of the euro has a negative impact on exports and a
positive effect on imports, confirming the fears of European politicians
and managers of the aeronautic sector. Third, distance consistently has
a negative impact on trade, but military spending favors exchanges of
aeronautic products. Fourth,we distinguish French imports and arrivals,
aswell as productsmanufactured in Europe and in France.With supple-
mentary estimations (Table 8), we show that outward FDI affects im-
ports and arrivals of European products negatively but affects imports
and arrivals of French products positively. Across all the models we de-
rived, we obtained a negative effect of the appreciation of the euro on
trade, reflecting the ongoing difficulties associated with exporting
goods produced in the euro area.
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